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Globalization is a complex process about which little can be said conﬁ-
dently without sustained and systematic empirical investigation into its
sources, channels, and eﬀects. Unfortunately, both avid critics and sup-
porters of globalization processes tend to argue on the basis of anecdotes,
which are always available to support a particular case. One of the more
signiﬁcant complaints about multinational enterprises is that, when locat-
ing in developing countries, they look for countries with weak labor rights.
Such conditions presumably permit ﬁrms to exploit local workers by pay-
ing them less than some notion of a fair wage. Given the breadth and com-
plexity of the world economy, claims of this kind can be misleading and
may support faulty policy prescriptions. Thus, economists look for sys-
tematic evidence in large data sets and use statistical techniques to identify
underlying regularities amidst the noise.
The purpose of this paper is to give a broad outline and discussion of
what knowledge we may claim with a reasonable degree of conﬁdence
about the patterns and determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI)
ﬂows to developing countries. We restrict the analysis to long-term direct
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tries that attract foreign investors. When analyzed through the ﬁlters of
general-equilibrium theory and extensive econometric analysis, is the
“sweatshop” view, in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) are prima-
rily attracted to countries with low-wage labor, the decisive model?
We begin with a review of recent theory in section 10.2, examining Mar-
kusen’s “knowledge-capital” model that allows for both horizontal and
vertical motives for foreign investment. This analysis suggests channels
through which FDI should be related to host-country characteristics. We
then present some summary statistics about which countries attract in-
ward investment in section 10.3. In section 10.4, we set out an econometric
speciﬁcation and provide estimates of this general-equilibrium model us-
ing data on outward investment from the United States to a large sample
of countries from 1986 to 1997. Compared to our earlier work (Carr, Mar-
kusen, and Maskus 2001; Markusen and Maskus 2001), the new feature
ofthe current paper is to introduce a measure of infrastructure quality into
the econometric estimation. Both the summary statistics and econometric
estimates we present indicate that manufacturing FDI ﬂows to countries
with relatively large markets, a relatively high endowment of labor skills,
laws and legal institutions that are friendly to investment, and sound eco-
nomic infrastructure.
Thus, our results do not support the sweatshop view of what features at-
tract MNEs. Rather, the estimates support the view obtained from basic
statistics that MNEs avoid the poorest countries in the world. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that increases in the diﬀerences in skill endowments be-
tween the United States and its investment partners tends to reduce local
aﬃliate activity signiﬁcantly, as found earlier in Markusen and Maskus
(2002) and Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003). However, we emphasize
that the data exercise in this paper considers only FDI in aggregate manu-
factures, rather than FDI in labor-intensive goods.
Overall, it is in the nature of what MNEs produce that makes cheap la-
bor not a strong attraction for production in developing countries. Our
conclusion is that developing countries stand to gain little in terms of in-
creasing FDI by artiﬁcially suppressing wages—for example, by limiting
rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively.1 That strategy is
likely to reduce productivity and investment, as noted by Martin and
Maskus (2001). If attracting FDI in manufacturing is a development pol-
icy, it is more sensible to increase the human capital stock and improve the
economic infrastructure. The conclusion that the quality of infrastructure
matters positively for attracting FDI has been demonstrated in informal
analyses by Wheeler and Mody (1992) for the Organization for Economic
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1. Maskus (1997) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD;
1996) discuss such policies in a number of countries.Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies and by Cheng and
Kwan (2000) for China. Interestingly, however, infrastructure seems to play
relatively little role in location decisions in sub-Saharan Africa, although
it is important in other developing regions (Asiedu 2002).
10.2 A Theoretical Framework
While there are many motives for direct investment, one simple taxon-
omy is between the horizontal (also known as market seeking) and the ver-
tical (also called resource seeking) investments. Horizontal investments re-
fer to multinational activities abroad that produce roughly the same goods
and services as the ﬁrm produces at home. Vertical investments refer to
MNEs geographically fragmenting the production process, locating each
stage where the factors used intensively in that stage are cheap.
Intuition would suggest that horizontal investments are made generally
to serve local markets and are therefore attracted to large markets (the
proverbial carrot) that are characterized by high trade costs that deter ex-
porting to those markets (the stick). If MNEs tend to produce relatively
sophisticated goods and services for high-income consumers, then hori-
zontal investments will tend to be directed to other relatively advanced
countries. Thus, a rough hypothesis is that horizontal investments tend to
occur between high-income countries and with the output sold locally
rather than exported.
Vertical investments seek favorable costs for diﬀerent stages of produc-
tion. One reasonable generalization is that the assembly and testing stages
are less skilled-labor and capital intensive than are design and component
production. Thus, ﬁrms will seek countries with low-wage and scarce labor
skills for assembly and testing operations. Assuming that most of the out-
put ultimately is to be sold in high-income countries, it follows that a large
portion of the output from vertical investments should be traded interna-
tionally rather than sold domestically. Thus, we might conjecture that ver-
tical investments tend to ﬂow from high-income to low-income countries,
with a high proportion of the output exported from the host country.
These generalizations are not perfect. There is rarely activity consisting
of pure horizontal investment insofar as parent ﬁrms supply knowledge-
based assets, services to and often components as well to subsidiaries. The
relationship between trade versus domestic sales and vertical versus hori-
zontal investments is imperfect as well. Many U.S. ﬁrms make what we
would generally think of as horizontal investments in the European Union
(EU) to serve the EU market, but production might be centered in a par-
ticular location, say Ireland. Since Ireland is a small part of EU consump-
tion, the proportion of output exported from Ireland will be high.
Markusen’s (2002) knowledge-capital model makes a number of as-
sumptions about technologies that permit diﬀerent types of ﬁrms to arise
Competition for Multinational Investment in Developing Countries 385endogenously as a function of the characteristics of two countries. First,
he assumes the existence of ﬁrm-level scale economies, a property that he
refers to as “jointness.” It is assumed that knowledge-based assets are at
least partially joint or public inputs across plants, giving rise to ﬁrm-level
scale economies. Second, he assumes that the creation of knowledge-based
assets can be geographically fragmented from output production at a fairly
low cost, a process called “fragmentation.” Third, he assumes that knowl-
edge-based assets are skilled-labor intensive relative to production, but also
generally claims that production is skilled-labor intensive relative to the rest
of the economy. This assumption is referred to as “skilled-labor intensity.”
Jointness is the key assumption that gives rise to horizontal multination-
als. Firm-level scale economies encourage multiplant ﬁrms to exploit ﬁrm-
level economies. If there are plant-level scale economies as well, however, it
is not trivially true that ﬁrms will always choose foreign-branch plants. For-
eign production will be chosen when the foreign market is large and trade
costs are moderate to high relative to plant-level scale economies.
Fragmentation and skilled-labor intensity encourage the vertical disper-
sion of activities, locating stages of production where the factors each stage
uses intensively are relatively cheap. Accordingly, skilled-labor-intensive
headquarters activities and component production may be located in the
high-income parent country, and less-skilled-labor-intensive production
may be located in a developing country, with a large proportion of the out-
put shipped back to the parent country.
One interesting general-equilibrium result follows from Markusen’s
assumption that branch-plant production (in particular, the ﬁxed costs of
setting up a branch plant) is more skilled-labor intensive than the rest of
the economy. This results in an inverted U-shaped relationship for aﬃliate
production in a developing country as a function of its skilled-labor
scarcity. Vertical production in which an assembly plant is located in the
developing country, for example, is most attractive for a ﬁrm when the de-
veloping country is moderately skilled-labor scarce. Resulting factor-price
diﬀerences give the ﬁrm an incentive to locate its headquarters in the
skilled-labor-abundant country and the assembly plant in the developing
country. But as the developing country becomes very skilled-labor scarce,
the price of skilled labor makes the ﬁxed costs of the branch plant prohib-
itively expensive, and the ﬁrm has an incentive to keep the assembly plant
at home.2Put a diﬀerent way, the MNE needs a minimum number of skilled
managers and technicians in the developing country, in which skills may
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2. Note that such a shortage could be relieved by permitting a temporary inﬂow of skilled
labor, perhaps within the ﬁrm from the headquarters to the plant location. The model as-
sumes that factors are immobile across borders (which is fairly consistent with reality in many
countries), thereby ruling out this possibility. The observation underscores the importance of
the current global debate about the gains and losses from temporary increases in skilled-labor
migration.command a high relative price. In fact, at a suﬃcient degree of skilled-labor
scarcity, the MNE will not invest even if unskilled labor is virtually free.
These results have some parallels in ﬁndings by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996, 1997). In their model, there is a continuum of activities needed to
produce a ﬁnal good and these activities can be ordered by their skilled-
labor intensity. Investment liberalization then leads to the shift of some
less-skilled activities to developing countries. This outcome is similar to
location of certain ﬁnal production activities, such as assembly, in the
Markusen model. Although Feenstra and Hanson do not explicitly ad-
dress the question of how much activity is shifted depending on the skilled-
labor scarcity of the developing country, our sense is that they would get
as imilar result that this output transfer would diminish as the developing
country gets extremely skilled-labor scarce.
There are thus several versions of theory that predict that the price of un-
skilled labor is not a decisive factor in attracting inward foreign invest-
ment. The need for skilled managers and technicians means that inward
investment diminishes as the potential host country gets suﬃciently
skilled-labor scarce.
In addition, labor-force composition in a developing country is likely
correlated with other economic variables that are important to MNEs.
These include physical, legal, and institutional infrastructure, in particu-
lar. Multinational ﬁrms need access to the services of roads, ports, reliable
electricity, telecommunications systems, and the like. They also need a
sound, transparent, and fair legal system, including an eﬃcient customs
service. Most of these variables are endogenously chosen by countries over
the long run, and our intuition is that they are likely to be highly correlated
with per capita income and the skill composition of the labor force. To the
extent that they derive from the same primitive characteristics that deter-
mine the labor force, the bottom line is that these infrastructure require-
ments reinforce the view that the poorest countries will not attract much
inward investment.
10.3 Some Stylized Facts
Table 10.1 presents some statistics on inward-direct-investment stocks
relative to income. Speciﬁcally, the numbers are shares of inward world-
FDI stocks divided by shares of world gross domestic product (GDP).
Countries are grouped according to the United Nations (UN) deﬁnition in
the World Investment Report. The “least developed countries” comprise a
group of forty-eight of the poorest nations. These countries are also in-
cluded in the group “developing countries,” and so the latter group’s ﬁgures
would be larger if the least developed countries were taken out. However,
this adjustment would be modest since both total FDI stocks and total
GDP levels of the least developed countries are quite small. These statistics
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tries, with their share in inward investment close to their share of income.
Developing countries are net recipients of inward investment, and their
share of inward investment relative to their share of income has grown by
33 percent over the eighteen-year period.
The point of table 10.1, for our purposes, is the relatively low ratios for
the least developed countries. These countries attract little inward invest-
ment in spite of very low wages for unskilled labor. The developing coun-
tries as a whole get about 2.5 times as much investment relative to income
as do the poorest countries. We suspect that the unattractiveness of the
least developed countries is a combination of poor labor skills, poor phys-
ical infrastructure, and generally poor government and legal institutions.
It should be noted that the FDI-GDP ratios rose for the least developed
countries over the period as well, but this trend largely reﬂects a declining
share of world GDP generated in those nations.
Table 10.2, taken from Zhang and Markusen (1999) presents data that
separate eﬀects on inward FDI ﬂows due to market size from eﬀects due
to per capita income. Developing countries are grouped according to per
capita GDP, and then each group is decomposed into relatively large and
small countries in terms of total GDP. Here we see a high correlation be-
tween GDP per capita and FDI per capita. Again, FDI in the poorest
countries is remarkably small. However, within any income group, we also
see that the larger countries get considerably more inward investment per
capita than do the smaller countries.
We infer from this ﬁnding that investment in developing countries is not
aimed solely at export production: The size of the local market matters,
suggesting that a signiﬁcant proportion of local output is intended for lo-
cal sale. With plant-level scale economies and output produced for local
sale, investment will be higher in larger economies, which is what we see in
the data. If all output were destined for export markets, we should not ob-
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Table 10.1 Share of Inward World FDI Stock Divided by Share of World GDP
Developed Developing Least Developed
Countries Countries Countries
1980 0.96 1.10 0.37
1985 0.91 1.36 0.51
1990 0.97 1.22 0.51
1995 0.92 1.40 0.72
1998 0.88 1.46 0.54
Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD; 2000) and
Zhang and Markusen (1999).
Note: “Least developed countries” is a UN deﬁnition that consists of forty-eight countries.Competition for Multinational Investment in Developing Countries 389
Table 10.2 Inward FDI Flows and Their Links with GDP Per Capita and National
Incomes of Developing Countries in 1993
Average FDI
Country Groups Per Capita
By GDP Per Capita (U.S.$)





  300 0.63
By Country Size in GDP (U.S.$ millions)
 55,000 242.20
  49,000 53.83
  31,000 45.73
  17,000 32.30
  10,000 33.43
  9,600 30.60
  10,000 10.86
  9,300 2.59
  4,800 6.91
  3,700 3.68
  2,000 0.34
  1,500 2.47
Sources:Table taken from Zhang and Markusen (1999). Original data for FDI as well as data
for GDP and population are from International Monetary Fund (IMF; 1995a, b).
serve this relationship in the data even with signiﬁcant plant-level scale
economies.
10.4 Data and Estimation
We deﬁne variables in order to capture the inﬂuences suggested by the-
ory, although we are constrained to measures for which we can obtain a
panel of data. An unfortunate irony for present purposes is that much of
the data on costs and infrastructure are generally not available for the
poorest countries, while the lack of investment into those countries is one
thing that we would like to explain.
The variables used in the estimation are as follows, in which jis employed
as the general reference to the host country. Note that the United States is
always the parent country, a problem that we will discuss further.
RSALES: Real aﬃliate sales of U.S. aﬃliates in country j
RSALESL: Real aﬃliate sales of U.S. aﬃliates in country j to the local
market in jRSALESE: Real aﬃliate sales of U.S. aﬃliates in country jto all export
markets
GDPUS: Real GDP in the United States (there is signiﬁcant time-
series variation in U.S. GDP, which is important for esti-
mation)
GDPJ: Real GDP in country j
SKJ: The share of the labor force in country j that is skilled
SKDIFF: The share of skilled labor in the United States minus that
in country j (SKUS – SKJ)
INVCJ: An index of costs and barriers to investing in country j
TCJ: An index of costs and barriers to exporting into country j
INFRAJ: An index of overall infrastructure quality for country j
DISTANCE: The distance between the United States and country j
The basic estimating equation is given by
RSALES      0GDPUS    1GDPJ    2SKDIFF    3SKDIFF 
  GDPJ    4INVCJ    5TCJ    6INFRAJ    7DISTANCE.
The theory underlying this formulation is discussed in Markusen (2002)
and in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001). Of particular interest here is
the interaction term between skill diﬀerences and real GDP in the recipi-
ent country. This term is designed to capture the nonlinear relationship in
the theoretical model between endowment diﬀerences and aﬃliate activity.
This relationship varies depending on the size of the host country as dis-
cussed above. Thus, GDPJ and SKDIFF appear in two variables. Our hy-























       2    3   GDPJ
The coeﬃcient  1 on GDPJ is expected to be positive, as is the coeﬃcient
 0 on GDPUS. In the underlying two-country model, both variables cap-
ture relevant market sizes.
Recall that SKDIFF is the skilled-labor share in the United States minus
the skilled-labor share in the host country. Because in most cases the
United States is relatively skill abundant in comparison with its partner,
this diﬀerence becomes larger the more skilled-labor scarce is the host.
Considering such cases, the derivative in equation (2) reﬂects both the di-
rect impact of an increase in host skill endowment (meaning a convergence
toward the U.S. level) and the indirect impact through the interaction of
skills with GDP. There is some theoretical ambiguity about the anticipated
390 David L. Carr, James R. Markusen, and Keith E. Maskussign here, as analyzed by Markusen. A purely vertical model would predict
that the derivative in equation (2) is negative. Because outward investment
is unskilled-labor seeking in this case, a convergence in skills would reduce
aﬃliate activity. However, a purely horizontal model would predict that
equation (2) is positive because outward investment seeks countries that
are similar to the United States and because a convergence in skills would
raise activity. The hybrid knowledge-capital model predicts some nonmo-
notonicity, with a rise in SKJ (a fall in SKDIFF for almost all observa-
tions) decreasing outward aﬃliate sales for relatively similar countries but
increasing outward aﬃliate sales when the host is already very skilled-
labor scarce. The theory cannot predict where the turning point is.
The coeﬃcient on the interactive term  3 is involved in two partial de-
rivatives: the change in RSALES with respect to GDPJ and the change in
RSALES with respect to SKDIFF. Coeﬃcient  3 is thus the cross-partial
derivative between GDPJ and SKDIFF. If we conjecture that the eﬀect of
an increase in host-country size is larger the more similar it is to the United
States in skilled-labor abundance, then we expect  3 to be negative. If we
conjecture that an increase in SKJ (generally a decrease in SKDIFF) has a
more positive (or less negative) eﬀect the larger country j is, then we again
expect  3 to be negative. Both of these conjectures clearly ﬁt a horizontal
model, but there is some ambiguity in the hybrid knowledge-capital model,
as noted earlier.
To summarize, the model does not support predictions about the signs
of individual coeﬃcients  2 and  3. As we shall see shortly, the coeﬃcient
 2 and  3 generally have diﬀerent signs in the regressions and, so it is im-
portant to compute equations (1) and (2) in order to ask whether or not
U.S. investment is skilled-labor seeking, rather than considering only the
sign of  2.
The hypotheses for the coeﬃcients on INVCJ and INFRAJ are clear, for
each measures certain aspects of the costs of establishment and operation.
The sign on INVCJ should be negative, and the sign on INFRAJ should be
positive. The sign of the coeﬃcient on TCJ is less clear. For horizontal in-
vestments, the sign should be positive as higher inward-trade costs induce
a shift from exporting to producing in the host country. But for vertical in-
vestments in which the output is exported, the sign should be zero or neg-
ative, the latter occurring if the MNE needs to ship substantial amounts of
component to the host-country plant, for example.
We also have hypotheses about the how regression results ought to diﬀer
for local sales versus export sales. Local sales should be more responsive to
the host-country market size and should also be more skilled-labor seeking
than export sales. Local sales should respond more positively to host-
country trade costs. We hypothesize that export sales likely respond more
negatively to investment costs and more positively to infrastructure, since
ﬁrms have alternative locations to choose from in selecting a plant location
Competition for Multinational Investment in Developing Countries 391for export production. Countries in which production is located for local
sale by deﬁnition have no close competitors.
Data for the estimation form a panel of cross-country observations over
the period 1986–1997. There are thirty-nine host countries for which we
have at least nine years of complete data over this twelve-year interval,
eighteen of which we classify as developing countries. Countries are listed
in table 10.3. We take real sales volume of nonbank manufacturing aﬃli-
ates in each country to indicate production activity. The U.S. Department
of Commerce provides annual data on sales of foreign aﬃliates of Ameri-
can parent ﬁrms and on sales of U.S. aﬃliates of foreign parent ﬁrms. In
this paper, we are only interested in outward investments, and so, unfortu-
nately, the United States is the parent country in every observation. The-
ory suggests that this limits the analysis since the United States is always
the larger of the two countries in any bilateral observation.
Annual sales values abroad are converted into millions of 1990 U.S. dol-
lars using an exchange-rate-adjusted local-wholesale-price index, with ex-
change rates and price indexes taken from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. Real aﬃliate sales (RSALES) are broken
down into two components, local sales (RSALESL) and export sales
(RSALESE). We should emphasize that we do not have observations for
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Table 10.3 Countries Included in the Regression Analysis











Israel The Republic of Korea
Italy Malaysia
Japan Mexico








The United States 
(parent country only)developing countries in which there is no U.S. aﬃliate activity. Since these
are generally the world’s poorest countries, this creates some bias in the es-
timation, a problem which will be discussed.
Real GDP is measured in billions of 1990 U.S. dollars for each country.
For this purpose, annual real GDP ﬁgures in local currencies were con-
verted into dollars using the market exchange rate. These data are also
from the IFS.
Skilled-labor abundance is deﬁned as the sum of occupational categories
0/1 (professional, technical, and kindred workers) and 2 (administrative
workers) in employment in each country, divided by total employment.
These ﬁgures are compiled from annual surveys reported in the Yearbook
of Labor Statistics published by the International Labor Organization
(ILO).3 In cases where some annual ﬁgures were missing, the skilled-labor
ratios were taken to equal the period averages for each country. The vari-
able SKDIFF is the relative skill endowment of the parent country less that
of the aﬃliate country (e.g., the variable is positive if the host country is
skilled-labor scarce). As noted, this variable is typically positive.
The cost of investing in the aﬃliate country is a simple average of several
indexes of perceived impediments to investment, reported in the World
Competitiveness Report (WCR) of the World Economic Forum. The in-
vestment-barriers index includes (a) restrictions on the ability to acquire
control in a domestic company; (b) limitations on the ability to employ for-
eign skilled labor; (c) restraints on negotiating joint ventures; (d) strict
controls on hiring and ﬁring practices; (e) market dominance by a small
number of enterprises; (f) an absence of fair administration of justice;
(g) diﬃculties in acquiring local bank credit; (h) restrictions on access to
local- and foreign-capital markets; and (i) inadequate protection of intel-
lectual property. The resulting indexes thus include some direct investment
barriers and indirect measures of “good government” and are computed
on a scale from 0 to 100, with a higher number indicating higher investment
costs.
A trade-cost index is taken from the same source and is deﬁned as a mea-
sure of national protectionism, or eﬀorts to prevent importation of com-
petitive products. It also runs from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest
trade costs. All of these indexes are based on extensive surveys of multina-
tional enterprises. It should be noted that both the investment-cost and
trade-cost indexes are ordinal and qualitative in nature and are without
“natural units.” Thus, regression coeﬃcients represent the partial eﬀects of
a change in the average perceived costs of investing and trading.
Finally, we use an index of overall infrastructure quality, also taken from
the WCR. We employ two measures of infrastructure. First, we take an in-
dex from the 1999 WCR that ranks countries based on the following ques-
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3. These surveys are now available on the web at http://www.ilo.org.tion: “The infrastructure of your country is far superior to that in other
countries.” This index ranges from 0 (strongly disagree) to 70 (strongly
agree). There is only one observation on this variable for each country, and
its value is used in every yearly observation for a given country. Conse-
quently, there is no time variation in this measure of infrastructure, labeled
INFRAJ1. A second measure does permit time variation by computing the
simple averages of responses given to questions about the quality of six
types of infrastructure: roads, railroads, ports, air transport, telecommu-
nications, and power supply. Unfortunately these data go back to 1986 for
only the industrialized countries and larger middle-income economies.
Other countries enter the WCR database at diﬀerent years during the
sample. Thus, a number of imputations were made to this second measure,
called INFRAJ2, to construct a full panel.4
We also incorporate a measure of distance, which is simply the number
of kilometers of each country’s capital city from Washington, D.C. It is un-
clear whether this variable captures elements of trade costs or of invest-
ment costs, since both should rise with distance.
For estimation we consider two samples. One uses the full sample of host
countries, consisting of 452 observations. The means of the variables in this
sample are shown in the top panel oftable 10.4. A second sample uses only
the developing countries and consists of 207 observations. Means of these
variables are shown in the bottom panel of table 10.4. Most of the diﬀer-
ences in the two samples are intuitively sensible. In the full sample average,
host-country GDP, labor skills, and infrastructure are higher or more
highly ranked, and investment and trade costs are lower relative to the de-
veloping-countries-only sample. One interesting feature of the data is that
the share of aﬃliate output that is exported is slightly higher in the full
sample. This is likely due in part to the inﬂuence of small, high-income
countries such as Canada, Ireland, and the Nordic countries, in which for-
eign aﬃliates export a large proportion of their output to regional trading
partners. Put another way, however, it is important to note the importance
of local sales for foreign aﬃliates in the developing countries, where 64 per-
cent of output is sold locally. This does not ﬁt the popular image of devel-
oping-country aﬃliates as export-oriented assembly plants.
It is worth noting that the infrastructure variables do not on average
seem to indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between developing countries and
the full sample. Using both INFRAJ1 and INFRAJ2, the mean observa-
tion in developing countries is 85 percent of that in the full sample.
Table 10.5provides sample correlations. It is notable that real local sales
are positively correlated with infrastructure quality in the large sample but
are not correlated with infrastructure in the developing countries. Export
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4. Details are available on request.sales are positively associated with infrastructure, however. Another in-
triguing result is that export sales and distance are negatively correlated in
the full sample but have no correlation in the developing-country sample.
There is a high degree of correlation among some of the independent
variables. A larger recipient market (GDPJ) is slightly negative correlated
with skill diﬀerences, as the larger countries tend to have skill ratios nearer
those of the United States. Note that in the smaller sample this correlation
becomes positive, indicating that smaller developing countries are more
skilled-labor scarce in the data. An important distinction in the data is
that, in the full sample, the correlations between GDPJ and investment
costs and trade costs are essentially zero, while they are strongly positive in
the developing countries. Skilled-labor scarce countries (a larger positive
value of SKDIFF) have higher investment and trade costs and worse in-
frastructure, although these correlations are somewhat smaller in the de-
veloping-country sample than in the full sample. Note ﬁnally that invest-
ment costs and trade costs are strongly and negatively correlated with
infrastructure quality.
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Table 10.4 Basic Data on U.S. Outward Aﬃliate Sales and Other Variables
Mean of
Variable Variable Qualifying Feature
All Countries (452 observations)




SKJ 0.18 Proportion of the labor force that is skilled
SKDIFF 0.11 Diﬀerences in skilled labor proportion
INVCJ 38.89 Range: 0–100; 100   highest costs
TCJ 34.61 Range: 0–100; 100   highest costs
INFRAJ1 45.07 Range: 0–70; 70   best infrastructure
INFRAJ2 63.42 Range: 0–100; 100   best infrastructure
DIST 8,555 Kilometers
Developing Countries (207 observations)




SKJ 0.12 Proportion of the labor force that is skilled
SKDIFF 0.18 Diﬀerences in skilled labor proportion
INVCJ 45.26 Range: 0–100; 100   highest costs
TCJ 39.85 Range: 0–100; 100   highest costs
INFRAJ1 37.65 Range: 0–70; 70   best infrastructure



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































010.5 Estimation Strategy and Results
Our task is to estimate the general-equilibrium determinants of real aﬃli-
ate sales in a panel of countries over the period 1986–1997. These data may
be expected both to display cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation within each country. Accordingly, we adopt two estimation
techniques. First is weighted least squares (WLS), in which we posit that er-
ror variances depend on real GDP in the host countries and compute robust
standard errors. Second is a generalized least squares (GLS) approach that
permits heteroskedastic error variances and country-speciﬁc AR(1) coeﬃ-
cients.5 An even more general speciﬁcation would permit contemporane-
ous, non-zero covariances across panels, but there are insuﬃcient degrees of
freedom to implement it. As Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrate with Monte
Carlo techniques, the latter approach would understate the true standard
errors, while the method taken here generates less eﬃcient but consistent es-
timates (Greene 2000). The GLS estimates report Newey-West standard er-
rors robust to heteroskedasticity and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
We do not include country eﬀects. Most variation in the key variables of
interest (size, skill diﬀerences, and especially investment costs, trade costs,
and infrastructure quality) is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. This
variation is central to our analysis but would be obscured by country-
speciﬁc dummies, rendering it virtually impossible to identify the impacts
of those inﬂuences on sales. Instead, we control for the variables posited by
the theory, with appropriately conservative standard errors. Note that the
inclusion of ﬁrst-order autocorrelation corrections by country poses a stiﬀ
test for estimating the coeﬃcients of policy variables, the values of which
change little over time.
Tables 10.6 through 10.8 depict regression results for the full sample
for total sales (RSALES), local sales (RSALESL), and export sales
(RSALESE) respectively, in which each model is estimated using each of
the two infrastructure variables in turn. Considering table 10.5, both the
WLS and GLS coeﬃcients on GDPUS are positive and strongly signiﬁ-
cant, as anticipated. Use of GLS reduces the magnitudes of these coeﬃ-
cients, although they are robust to use of the diﬀerent infrastructure mea-
sures. Investment costs signiﬁcantly discourage inward investment using
either method, but GLS dramatically cuts the size of the estimated impact.
A similar result emerges for trade costs, which strongly encourage aﬃliate
sales using WLS but have far smaller coeﬃcients that fail to achieve sig-
niﬁcance at the 10 percent level using GLS.
The ﬁrst and third columns indicate that high-quality infrastructure
strongly encourages inward investment, using INFRAJ1. However, this
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5. We also estimated a speciﬁcation with an AR(1) coeﬃcient common to all panels, but
this case was rejected in favor of the more ﬂexible approach.variable is deﬁned only for the year 1998, and its values are assigned to all
earlier years for each country. Thus, it takes on the nature of any variable
that would be stable over the period and correlated with the perceived qual-
ity of infrastructure at the end of the period. Turning to INFRAJ2 in col-
umns (2) and (4), when infrastructure is permitted to vary within the panel,
its inﬂuence becomes smaller, although still signiﬁcant using WLS and in-
signiﬁcant using GLS. It is likely that this weakness in the estimation stems
from collinearity between infrastructure and the cost variables. Note that
the inclusion of INFRAJ2 raises the size and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
on investment costs in the GLS approach. Judging from the log-likelihood
statistics in the GLS equations, the models with INFRAJ2 ﬁt the data
slightly better than those with INFRAJ1.
Similar results pertain in the regressions on local sales in table 10.7. In-
vestment costs negatively aﬀect local sales in the WLS case, and the coeﬃ-
cients are highly signiﬁcant. Again, these magnitudes fall considerably us-
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Table 10.6 RSALES Regression Results for Full Sample
Coeﬃcients
WLS WLS GLS GLS
GDPUS 7.06 6.38 3.47 3.53
(4.56/0.000) (4.08/0.000) (8.87/0.000) (10.17/0.000)
GDPJ 76.59 77.60 57.61 50.34
(28.50/0.000) (28.51/0.000) (16.00/0.000) (13.40/0.000)
SKDIFF 100,223.00 92,804.00 46,184.00 24,641.00
(7.77/0.000) (7.07/0.000) (8.14/0.000) (4.77/0.000)
SKD   GDPJ –472.76 –472.57 –333.45 –267.44
(–22.77/0.000) (–22.34/0.000) (–13.88/0.000) (–12.05/0.000)
INVCJ –619.75 –636.33 –39.46 –70.02
(–5.91/0.000) (–5.70/0.000) (–2.28/0.023) (–4.19/0.000)
TCJ 414.25 405.31 14.73 12.82





DISTANCE –1.77 –1.61 –0.89 –0.82
(–9.14/0.000) (–8.33/0.000) (–8.17/0.000) (–9.57/0.000)
Intercept –34,104.00 –26,317.00 –18,421.00 –9,148.00
(–3.01/0.003) (–2.24/0.026) (–7.21/0.000) (–4.04/0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.83
Log likelihood –4,084.59 –4,077.53
No. of observations 452 452 452 452
Notes: The WLS has host-country-GDP-weighted OLS with robust standard errors; GLS 
has heteroskedasticity and panel-speciﬁc AR(1) corrections with robust standard errors. 
T-statistics followed by p-values are in parentheses. ing GLS, although the estimate in column (4) is signiﬁcant. Trade costs
have a strongly positive impact using WLS, but the positive coeﬃcients
with GLS are imprecisely estimated. The ﬁrst measure of infrastructure
quality is positively associated with local sales, but the second measure is
insigniﬁcant using GLS. Results for export sales in table 10.8 are qualita-
tively similar to those for local sales.
Turning to GDPJ and SKJ (a component of SKDIFF), it is not mean-
ingful to give an economic interpretation to the direct coeﬃcients as these
factors appear in two places among the independent variables.6 It is also
inappropriate to make comparisons across the regressions in tables 10.6
through 10.8 because the dependent variables have diﬀerent means. Thus,
we take partial derivatives and compute elasticities in table 10.9 for each es-
timation method, evaluating the elasticities at the mean of each respective
independent variable. Elasticities that derive from signiﬁcant regression
coeﬃcients are listed in boldface.
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Table 10.7 RSALESL Regression Results for Full Sample
Coeﬃcients
WLS WLS GLS GLS
GDPUS 4.42 4.11 1.83 1.85
(4.87/0.000) (4.51/0.000) (9.89/0.000) (10.42/0.000)
GDPJ 48.20 48.65 35.63 35.99
(30.56/0.000) (30.63/0.000) (14.75/0.000) (15.55/0.000)
SKDIFF 53,054.00 49,129.00 14,735.00 9,964.00
(7.01/0.000) (6.41/0.000) (5.04/0.000) (3.51/0.000)
SKD   GDPJ –281.61 –281.24 –170.11 –162.85
(–23.10/0.000) (–22.78/0.000) (–12.82/0.000) (–13.33/0.000)
INVCJ –293.17 –307.72 –12.22 –26.21
(–4.76/0.000) (–4.73/0.000) (–1.16/0.244) (–2.56/0.011)
TCJ 270.03 266.03 4.70 3.53





DISTANCE –0.96 –0.88 –0.11 –0.08
(–8.40/0.000) (–7.79/0.000) (–2.25/0.025) (–1.85/0.064)
Intercept –24,541.00 –20,240.00 –11,913.00 –9,208.00
(–3.69/0.000) (–2.95/0.000) (–8.95/0.000) (–7.44/0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.85
Log likelihood –3,792.89 –3,782.76
No. of observations 452 452 452 452
Notes: See table 10.6.
6. In the tables, SKD   GDPJ refers to the product of SKDIFF and GDPJ.Because the relationships between our dependent variables and GDPJ
and SKJ are nonlinear, we have computed elasticities at two diﬀerent
points in the sample for each variable. Recall that SKDIFF is positivewhen
the host-country is skilled-labor scarce relative to the United States, which
is true for the bulk of the observations in the sample. At the (positive) mean
value of SKDIFF, aﬃliate sales have a modest income elasticity of 0.56
(WLS) or 0.48 (GLS). For skilled-labor-abundant countries (SKDIFF  
0), the income elasticity is much larger. In both cases, local sales are more
income elastic than export sales, which is what we would expect. There are
virtually no diﬀerences between these estimates arising from the use of di-
ﬀering infrastructure measures.
The elasticity of aﬃliate sales with respect to the host-country skilled-
labor endowment (SKJ) is positive at mean host-country GDP, estimated
at  0.83 (WLS) or 0.86 (GLS). This means that outward investment is
skilled-labor seeking. However, for smaller countries (note that these are
not necessarily the developing countries) captured by estimating the elas-
ticity at one-half the mean market size, local sales are less responsive to a
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Table 10.8 RSALESE Regression Results for Full Sample
Coeﬃcients
WLS WLS GLS GLS
GDPUS 2.63 2.27 0.85 0.72
(3.47/0.000) (2.95/0.003) (5.52/0.000) (4.93/0.000)
GDPJ 28.42 28.98 19.42 18.29
(21.59/0.000) (21.67/0.000) (14.31/0.000) (13.11/0.000)
SKDIFF 47,283.00 43,780.00 14,402.00 11,426.00
(7.49/0.000) (6.79/0.000) (5.85/0.000) (5.52/0.000)
SKD   GDPJ –191.28 –191.47 –111.96 –98.48
(–18.81/0.000) (–18.43/0.000) (–11.39/0.000) (–10.48/0.000)
INVCJ –328.18 –330.29 –12.97 –11.88
(–6.39/0.000) (–6.03/0.000) (–2.26/0.024) (–1.96/0.049)
TCJ 144.44 139.50 5.25 3.83





DISTANCE –0.82 –0.73 –0.15 –0.08
(–8.59/0.000) (–7.70/0.000) (–3.08/0.002) (–1.99/0.047)
Intercept –8,512.00 –6,015.00 –5,245.00 –4,215.00
(–1.71/0.087) (–1.04/0.299) (–5.17/0.000) (–4.70/0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.75
Log likelihood –3,636.68 –3,625.70
No. of observations 452 452 452 452
Notes: See table 10.6.rise in skills. Employing WLS, these elasticities are negative. For GLS,
at one-third the average market size, the elasticities of RSALES and
RSALESE with respect to SKJ turn negative, while that for RSALESL
changes signs at one-ﬁfth the average GDPJ. This ﬁnding suggests that
aﬃliate production is unskilled-labor seeking in small host countries. This
may be particularly true in cases where the export motive is more impor-
tant for smaller nations and where production for export is more sensitive
to labor costs than production for local sale. Note from the computations
that export sales are less skilled-labor seeking (and more unskilled-labor
seeking) than local sales.
The remaining sets of elasticities have the hypothesized signs, although
they are not always signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. There are large diﬀer-
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Table 10.9 Elasticities of U.S. Outward-Aﬃliate Sales, Full Sample








SKDIFF   0
WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS
With respest to GDPJ
RSALES 0.56 0.48 1.74 1.31 0.58 0.48 1.76 1.14
RSALESL 0.65 0.64 1.82 1.35 0.67 0.69 1.84 1.36
RSALESE 0.42 0.40 1.61 1.10 0.45 0.42 1.65 1.04









WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS
With respect to SKJ
RSALES 0.83 0.86 –0.14 0.17 0.91 0.82 –0.06 0.28
RSALESL 0.95 0.89 –0.01 0.31 1.02 0.93 0.06 0.37
RSALESE 0.44 0.75 –0.22 0.18 0.75 0.69 –0.23 0.19
With respect to INVCJ
RSALES –1.48 –0.09 –1.52 –0.17
RSALESL –1.16 –0.05 –1.23 –0.10
RSALESE –1.95 –0.08 –1.97 –0.07
With respect to TCJ
RSALES 0.88 0.03 0.86 0.03
RSALESL 0.95 0.02 0.94 0.01
RSALESE 0.77 0.03 0.74 0.02
With respect to INFRA
RSALES 0.72 0.48 0.48 0.03
RSALESL 0.53 0.16 0.30 0.02
RSALESE 1.00 0.16 0.75 0.03
Note: Parameters coming from statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are in boldface.ences in these parameters between the WLS and GLS estimates, with the
latter being much smaller and sometimes not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Again, the diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that the AR(1) corrections tend
to remove much of the time-series variation from these policy variables.
Export sales are more (negatively) sensitive to investment barriers than are
local sales. The trade cost elasticities are positive for WLS but essentially
zero for GLS. Total sales are positively responsive to the ﬁrst infrastructure
measure, as are local and export sales. The infrastructure measure that
varies over time, INFRAJ2, has positive elasticities using WLS, with ex-
port sales being most sensitive to its quality. However, in GLS, this measure
has no discernible impacts on any of the sales ﬂows.
Regression estimates for the sample of developing countries are shown
in tables 10.10 through 10.12.7Overall, the equations ﬁt this sample to a de-
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Table 10.10 RSALES Regression Results for Developing-Country Sample
Coeﬃcients
WLS WLS GLS GLS
GDPUS 5.67 5.31 2.58 2.72
(5.31/0.000) (4.99/0.000) (6.40/0.000) (7.14/0.000)
GDPJ 81.74 80.73 71.54 73.11
(9.74/0.000) (9.50/0.000) (7.82/0.000) (8.46/0.000)
SKDIFF –14,043.00 –24,789.00 12,640.00 10,407.00
(–1.02/0.310) (–1.88/0.062) (1.61/0.108) (1.29/0.198)
SKD   GDPJ –317.22 –310.29 –283.48 –294.06
(–7.86/0.000) (–7.62/0.000) (–7.03/0.000) (–7.67/0.000)
INVCJ –58.97 –83.51 –22.55 –28.16
(–0.80/0.427) (–1.12/0.264) (–2.13/0.033) (–2.45/0.014)
TCJ 5.97 –12.85 4.21 5.94





DISTANCE –0.24 –0.04 –0.13 –0.13
(–1.57/0.118) (–0.31/0.759) (–1.39/0.165) (–1.51/0.305)
Intercept –28,256.00 –20,379.00 –14,751.00 –13,561.00
(–3.46/0.001) (–2.67/0.008) (–5.37/0.000) (–6.52/0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.71
Log likelihood –1,697.59 –1,701.37
No. of observations 207 207 207 207
Notes: See table 10.6.
7. We ran the same regressions for the sample of developed countries as well. In all impor-
tant respects for our purposes, the results were both qualitatively and quantitatively similar
to the ﬁndings for the full sample of countries. One interesting diﬀerence was that increases
in investment costs seemed to have greater deterrent impacts on inward FDI in developedgree similar to the full sample for total aﬃliate sales and local aﬃliate sales,
but the export sales equation performs less well. The coeﬃcients on GD-
PUS are highly signiﬁcant and similar to their counterparts for the full
sample, although generally somewhat smaller in magnitude, suggesting
that demand in the U.S. market is a slightly less important determinant of
aﬃliate activity in developing nations. In contrast, the coeﬃcients on local
GDP are somewhat larger in the total-sales and local-sales regressions for
developing countries, indicating that size of the local market is at least as
important in developing countries for attracting FDI as it is overall. These
coeﬃcients in export sales are negative and insigniﬁcant in the WLS cases
for developing countries. Conceivably, this result indicates that export pro-
duction has little relationship to the economic size of the host country. For
example, Singapore and Hong Kong are small economies but large ex-
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Table 10.11 RSALESL Regression Results for Developing-Country Sample
Coeﬃcients
WLS WLS GLS GLS
GDPUS 3.06 2.93 2.05 2.12
(5.75/0.000) (5.53/0.000) (10.23/0.000) (11.12/0.000)
GDPJ 81.76 81.48 49.48 49.64
(19.55/0.000) (19.33/0.000) (6.37/0.000) (6.56/0.000)
SKDIFF 22,331.00 17,975.00 11,158.00 7,563.00
(3.26/0.001) (2.74/0.001) (2.01/0.045) (1.57/0.117)
SKD   GDPJ –336.41 –334.27 –200.69 –201.15
(–16.74/0.000) (–16.55/0.000) (–6.01/0.000) (–6.12/0.000)
INVCJ –36.90 –47.23 –18.30 –21.08
(–1.00/0.319) (–1.28/0.203) (–2.39/0.017) (–2.82/0.005)
TCJ 2.15 –5.59 3.15 3.59





DISTANCE –0.30 –0.22 –0.17 –0.13
(–3.90/0.000) (–3.25/0.001) (–3.29/0.001) (–3.91/0.000)
Intercept –18,491.00 –15,297.00 –10,929.00 –10,182.00
(–4.55/0.000) (–4.04/0.000) (–7.35/0.000) (–7.95/0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.85
Log likelihood –1,612.15 –1,612.31
No. of observations 207 207 207 207
Notes: See table 10.6.
countries than in the overall sample. However, our overall conclusions were unchanged by
considering this sample alone.porters. However, the ﬁnding seems anomalous given the strongly positive
coeﬃcients registered in the GLS cases.
Regression coeﬃcients on the policy variables in the developing-
country sample are estimated less precisely than in the full sample, pre-
sumably, in part because of the smaller number of observations. In the
GLS equations, local investment costs tend to have negative and signiﬁ-
cant impacts on aﬃliate activity, particularly for total and local sales. The
eﬀects of trade costs are imprecisely estimated and cannot be conﬁdently
signed in any of the speciﬁcations. Considering the WLS equations, the
impacts of INFRAJ1 (the unchanging measure of infrastructure quality)
are uniformly positive for each type of aﬃliate sales, but the coeﬃcient
magnitudes are generally lower than in the full sample.8However, the qual-
ity of infrastructure, as measured here, has no detectable impact on aﬃli-
ate sales in the developing-country sample using the GLS approach. In our
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Table 10.12 RSALESE Regression Results for Developing-Country Sample
Coeﬃcients
WLS WLS GLS GLS
GDPUS 2.61 2.39 0.23 0.37
(4.25/0.000) (3.90/0.000) (1.57/0.117) (2.46/0.014)
GDPJ –0.34 –1.06 13.90 12.96
(–0.07/0.944) (–0.22/0.829) (7.72/0.000) (6.81/0.000)
SKDIFF –36,983.00 –43,201.00 3,446.00 2,459.00
(–4.68/0.000) (–5.69/0.000) (1.56/0.120) (0.98/0.328)
SKD   GDPJ 20.70 25.43 –50.09 –48.67
(0.89/0.373) (1.09/0.279) (–4.89/0.000) (–4.88/0.000)
INVCJ –23.27 –37.28 –2.64 –3.84
(–0.55/0.585) (–0.87/0.386) (–0.86/0.388) (–1.01/0.314)
TCJ 4.66 –6.29 1.62 2.49





DISTANCE 0.06 0.18 –0.02 –0.03
(0.66/0.510) (2.27/0.025) (–0.69/0.491) (–0.93/0.51)
Intercept –9,623.00 –5,002.00 –1,258.00 –2,170.00
(–2.05/0.041) (–1.14/0.256) (–1.41/0.158) (–3.04/0.002)
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.49
Log likelihood –1,467.92 –1,481.54
No. of observations 207 207 207 207
Notes: See table 10.6.
8. Again, we caution that comparisons of coeﬃcient sizes across samples can be mislead-
ing because the means of the dependent variables diﬀer.view, this weakness likely reﬂects three factors. First, we have few least de-
veloped countries in the sample, for which both FDI and infrastructure
quality would be low. Second, our measure of infrastructure may not cap-
ture its eﬀects on investment adequately. Finally, the AR(1) corrections in
the GLS approach essentially remove the trend increases in infrastructure
quality, which seems to leave little variation across the developing-country
sample.
The coeﬃcients on SKDIFF vary across estimation techniques and
across types of aﬃliate sales in tables 10.10 through 10.12. However, the
full marginal impacts of a change in skill endowments depend on both the
SKDIFF and SKDIFF   GDPJ coeﬃcients, evaluated at various sample
points. Thus, in table 10.13, we calculate relevant elasticities in a manner
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Table 10.13 Elasticities of U.S. Outward Aﬃliate Sales, Developing-Country Sample








SKDIFF   0
WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS
With respect to GDPJ
RSALES 0.71 0.59 2.29 2.00 0.71 0.58 2.26 2.05
RSALESL 0.96 0.61 3.60 2.18 0.97 0.61 3.59 2.19
RSALESE 0.26 0.38 –0.03 1.07 0.27 0.33 –0.08 0.99









WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS WLS GLS
With respect to SKJ
RSALES 1.36 0.69 0.82 0.21 1.56 0.77 1.04 0.28
RSALESL 1.05 0.70 0.16 0.17 1.18 0.82 0.30 0.29
RSALESE 1.91 0.27 2.00 0.03 2.22 0.30 2.34 0.08
With respect to INVCJ
RSALES –0.46 –0.18 –0.65 –0.22
RSALESL –0.45 –0.23 –0.58 –0.26
RSALESE –0.50 –0.06 –0.80 –0.08
With respect to TCJ
RSALES 0.04 0.03 –0.09 0.04
RSALESL 0.02 0.03 –0.06 0.04
RSALESE 0.09 0.03 –0.12 0.05
With respect to INFRA
RSALES 0.74 0.17 0.04 –0.04
RSALESL 0.44 0.20 –0.02 –0.02
RSALESE 1.25 0.31 0.14 0.04
Note: Parameters coming from statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are in boldface.parallel with table 10.9, again noting in boldface those parameters coming
from statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Comparing results in tables 10.9
and 10.13, it seems that total sales and local sales are more elastic with re-
spect to income increases in the developing economies than in the overall
sample. This is especially true for relatively high-skilled host countries,
such as Singapore, where local production is highly income elastic. Export
production is somewhat less sensitive to an increase in local market size in
developing countries.
Interestingly, all of the elasticities with respect to increases in skill en-
dowments are positive and signiﬁcant in the developing-country sample.
Thus, aﬃliate production is clearly skilled-labor seeking within this sample
of largely middle-income nations. Contrary to the results for the full
sample, aﬃliate production for export is more skilled-labor seeking than
production for local sale, at least using the WLS coeﬃcients. However, this
result does not survive the use of GLS and must be left open for further re-
search. Finally, it seems that the investment-cost variable has a negative im-
pact on local sales (using GLS) and that infrastructure quality has a posi-
tive impact on all sales ﬂows (using WLS). Production for export is more
sensitive to infrastructure quality than are domestic and total production.
Again, however, these results are sensitive to the deﬁnition of infrastruc-
ture and the estimation technique. The trade-cost variable has a very small
numerical magnitude, and it is never statistically signiﬁcant.
10.6 Summary and Conclusions
As is often observed, there is a strong tendency for those concerned
about the eﬀects of globalization to see MNEs as primarily drawn to low-
wage labor-abundant countries. It is easy to ﬁnd anecdotes to support this
view. The purpose of this paper is to see whether or not this characteriza-
tion holds up in a relatively comprehensive data set.
A casual look at data in the World Investment Report makes it clear that
the poorest countries of the world receive very little investment. It is not
clear whether this is due to poor labor skills, poor infrastructure, or bad
governance. Thus, we construct a data set of U.S. outward-aﬃliate activi-
ties and try to explain the cross-country variation by a set of host-country
characteristics including size, labor-force composition, investment barri-
ers, trade costs, and physical infrastructure. We use a full sample of all host
countries and a subsample using only developing countries. Unfortunately,
the data exclude all of the world’s poorest countries, and, since these get al-
most no inward investment, we are losing many of the observations that we
would most like to explain.
The general conclusion is that U.S. outward investment seeks large,
skilled-labor-abundant countries. In the full sample, outward investment
seems to be unskilled-labor seeking for small markets, a conclusion that
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skilled-labor-abundant countries.9
The preponderance of results suggests that increases in investment costs
or investment barriers discourage inward investment and aﬃliate activity.
Higher trade costs seem to encourage investment, but this result is weak,
especially in the developing-country sample. Finally, higher-quality infra-
structure seems to encourage investment and aﬃliate sales in most of our
speciﬁcations. This result is in evidence suﬃciently enough that it would be
worthwhile to develop a more comprehensive infrastructure index and to
incorporate many more countries into the analysis.
Turning to production for local sales versus exports, the data reveal the
unexpected result that the share of production sold locally is in fact a bit
lower in the full sample than in the developing-country sample. The char-
acterization that MNE enter developing countries primarily to produce for
export is another view that is not supported by the analysis in this paper.
Overall, we reach the following conclusions from comparing the local-
sales and export-sales regressions.
First, aﬃliates in developing countries are not more export oriented
than aﬃliates in the full sample of countries; local market sales are over 60
percent of the total in developing countries. Second, aﬃliate production is
more income elastic the more similar the host country is to the United
States in labor-force composition. Third, production for local sale is more
income elastic than production for export sale. Fourth, production activi-
ties for both local sales and exports are generally skilled-labor seeking, but
which type of ﬂow is more skilled-labor seeking diﬀers between the full
sample and the developing-country sample. It is interesting that activity in
the developing countries appears to be more responsive to an increase in
local skill endowments than in the full sample, at least according to the
WLS regressions. Fifth, production for export sale is more sensitive to in-
vestment costs and infrastructure quality than is production for local sale.
However, these last two results are not robust to estimation technique.
Note that our regressions perform worst in explaining production for ex-
port sales in developing countries, indicating that missing explanatory
variables likely are important.
All of these results ﬁt reasonably well with both formal theories of the
MNE and informal conjectures about the role of infrastructure. These re-
sults and the related theory do not lend support to view that MNEs exploit
and impoverish developing countries. Indeed, the theories to which the em-
pirical results lend support suggest that inward investments are of sub-
stantial beneﬁt to host countries, both in terms of overall income and in
terms of promoting labor-skills upgrading. Finally, we note again the ab-
sence of data on the poorest of the developing countries. It would be use-
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tions.
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Comment Anthony J. Venables
The paper examines the factors that are important in attracting multi-
national investment to a country. This is an important issue because, as the
authors point out, the charge is often made that the presence of footloose
multinationals creates an incentive for countries to engage in a “race to the
bottom,” particularly in labor standards. However, might it not be possible
that in other dimensions there is a “race to the top”? Multinationals may
be attracted by good institutions, good business environments, and high-
quality infrastructure. To establish the incentives that countries face we
need to know what it is that attracts multinational activity, and this is pre-
cisely the goal of this paper.
The authors use data on the activities of U.S.-based multinationals to in-
vestigate the importance of a number of diﬀerent factors. They start by re-
viewing theory, and noting that diﬀerent forces are important for diﬀerent
sorts of FDI. The usual distinction is between horizontal (or market-
serving) investment, and vertical (or production-cost-saving) investment.
The authors outline the way in which these can be nested in a single model,
although even then the eﬀects are complex. Aﬃliate activities may be un-
skilled labor intensive relative to the United States, but quite skilled labor
intensive relative to the endowments of many developing countries. There
may then be an inverse U-shaped relationship between aﬃliate presence
and potential host countries’ skilled-labor abundance.
The econometric model developed by the authors is applied to a panel of
data on sales of U.S. multinationals’ aﬃliates located in thirty-nine host
countries (unfortunately, the data set does not extend to the lowest-income
countries). Aﬃliate activity is a function of host-country size, endowment
of skilled labor, barriers to investment and to trade, infrastructure quality,
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don School of Economics.and distance from the United States. Robust results are found on the im-
portance of market size (positive), investment costs (negative), trade costs
(positive), and distance (negative). Good infrastructure also tends to raise
investment, although results are not robust over all speciﬁcations.
Insights on how the type of investment that multinationals undertake
varies with the characteristics of host countries is derived by interacting
measures of skill with measures of market size. The authors ﬁnd that hav-
ing a highly skilled labor force promotes multinational activity in large
countries. However, in small countries the presence of highly skilled labor
is much less important. Looking just at the extent to which multinationals
export products from the host country, low skill intensity becomes a posi-
tive force. This suggests, then, the coexistence in the data of two types of
investment. Rather skill-intensive horizontal activity goes to large and
skill-abundant countries, with less skill-intensive vertical activity being
more important for smaller economies.
On the critical side, a number of comments can be made about the au-
thors’ econometric speciﬁcation. It is surprising that they use a linear, not
log-linear, speciﬁcation. It is natural to think of many of the relationships
as ratios (sales relative to GDP, rather than the absolute level of sales), par-
ticularly since there is a huge range of country sizes (from Singapore to
China) in the data. Their linear speciﬁcation means, for example, that a 1-
point increase in the index of investment costs is associated with the same
absolute dollar change in multinational activity in China as in New Zea-
land. A proportional relationship would seem more plausible.
It would have been interesting to see estimates of the impact of various
measures of production costs. The authors use an endowment quantity
measure (the share of the labor force that is skilled) rather than a price
measure, no doubt based on general-equilibrium reasoning. However, use
of a labor-cost measure instead of (or as well as) the endowment measure
would be interesting, and not subject to serious endogeneity concerns.
Finally, it would have been good if some of the trade-oﬀs implied by the
estimates had been drawn out more explicitly. If a country is more remote,
how much better does its infrastructure have to be to attract the same level
of multinational activity? If wages go up, does this deter investment, and
how much of an improvement in the business environment can oﬀset it?
Answering these questions would establish the trade-oﬀs that countries
face in shaping policy to attract investment, and the incentives they have
for engaging in races to the bottom or to the top.
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